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WILSON WONG AND YING-HO KWONG
Political Marketing in Macao
A Solution to the Legitimacy Gap for a Hybrid Regime?
ABSTRACT
To what extent can political marketing narrow the legitimacy gap for a hybrid regime?
This article examines this question through the case of Macao (2009–14). It finds that
political marketing is insufficient to compensate for lack of democratic reform andmay
easily backfire to expose the problem of a structural legitimacy deficit.
KEYWORDS: political marketing, political legitimacy, democratization, hybrid
regime, Macao
INTRODUCTION
Political marketing is a strategy widely adopted by democracies in campaigns
and elections.1 With its demonstrated effects,2 it has been increasingly
extended to a non-democratic context by rulers in authoritarian regimes and
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in hybrid regimes (those with both democratic and authoritarian elements) to
enhance the legitimacy of their government. Consistent with this trend,
recent literature recognizes that modern Chinese leaders have used political
marketing to build up their positive image and gain public support to main-
tain regime legitimacy.3 Many local governments at the province, county, and
city levels in China have also adopted similar strategies to improve state–
society relations.4 In the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR),
since assuming the ofﬁce of chief executive in 2009, Fernando Chui Sai-on
has followed in the footsteps of the central leaders and put political marketing
at the core of his overall governing strategy. Under the former chief executive,
Edmund Ho Hau-wah, the MSAR government faced heavy criticism ranging
from charges of ‘‘corruption’’ to ‘‘black box operation’’ and lost legitimacy
due to a series of political scandals.5 In response, after coming to ofﬁce,
Fernando Chui greatly expanded efforts using political marketing to reduce
the legitimacy gap by designing the political brands of ‘‘sunshine govern-
ment’’ and ‘‘scientiﬁc administration’’ to emphasize democratic elements for
improving transparency, consultation, and deliberation.
In addition to winning public trust, maintaining political stability, and,
ultimately, enhancing legitimacy, Chui aimed to use political marketing to
reduce public pressure for major political reforms. His overall governing
philosophy was consistent with the logic of the Chinese central government,
which attached more importance to promising certain democratic elements
(transparency, accountability, intra-party democracy, deliberation, and anti-
corruption) than to conducting any fundamental political reform.6
Does political marketing really work across political settings and regime
types? The case of Macao leads to the important question: To what extent can
3. Yuezhi Zhao, ‘‘The Challenge of China: Contribution to a Transcultural Political Economy of
Communication for the Twenty-First Century,’’ in Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock, and Helena
Sousa, eds., The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011):
558–82; Xiaoling Zhang, The Transformation of Political Communication in China: From Propaganda
to Hegemony (Singapore: World Scientiﬁc, 2011); Siqi Zheng and Matthew E. Kahn, ‘‘Understanding
China’s Urban Pollution Dynamics,’’ Journal of Economic Literature 51:3 (2013): 731–72.
4. Zhendong Luo, Xu Wang, and Yi Hu, ‘‘Urban Scaling-Up and Endogenous Development
Promoted by Continuous City Marketing: A Case Study of Xuyi County, China,’’ Planning Theory
12:4 (2013): 406–24.
5. Sonny Shiu Hing Lo, ‘‘One Formula, Two Experiences: Political Divergence of Hong Kong
and Macao since Retrocession,’’ Journal of Contemporary China 16:52 (2007): 359–87, at 364.
6. Joseph Fewsmith, The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in China (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), 175.
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political marketing narrow the legitimacy gap of a government in a hybrid
regime? This article addresses the question by examining the case of Macao
under the government of Fernando Chui in his ﬁrst term of ofﬁce (2009–14).
It argues that political marketing alone is often insufﬁcient to compensate for
a lack of fundamental democratic reform because it is difﬁcult for a non-
democratic or hybrid regime to imitate a democracy fully and deliver all its
major qualities and performance outcomes. On the contrary, rather than
enhancing legitimacy, the unfulﬁlled promises and unmet expectations gener-
ated by the political marketing of a hybrid regime can expose the structural
problems of its undemocratic system. It can therefore lead to a further widen-
ing of the legitimacy gap and may even fuel the democratization movement.
Empirically, this paper adopts a political marketing perspective to account
for the case of post-colonial Macao, considering empirical evidence. In the
theoretical section, we explore the implications of adopting political market-
ing in a hybrid regime. First, we review the literature on political marketing
from its application in campaigns in democracies to its use by governments of
non-democratic regimes. Second, the paper discusses its application in Ma-
cao, including the political positioning of the MSAR and how Fernando Chui
used the political brands of ‘‘sunshine government’’ and ‘‘scientiﬁc administra-
tion’’ and the appeal of democratic elements such as transparency, consultation,
and deliberation in his attempts to enhance legitimacy. Finally, the effective-
ness of political marketing in Macao and the implications of the analysis of
Macao’s governance for the study of comparative politics are discussed.
POLITICAL MARKETING: FROM CAMPAIGNING IN DEMOCRACIES
TO GOVERNING IN HYBRID REGIMES
In the ﬁeld of governance studies, political marketing has developed into an
important theoretical perspective.7 By deﬁnition, political marketing refers to
how political elites use marketing tools and concepts to understand, respond
to, engage, and communicate with their political market.8 Political marketing
has been extensively studied in the analysis of electoral campaigns in
7. Bruce I. Newman and Richard M. Perloff, ‘‘Political Marketing: Theory, Research and Ap-
plications,’’ in Lynda Lee Kaid, ed., Handbook of Political Communication Research (Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum): 14–43.
8. Jennifer Lees-Marshment, Political Marketing: Principles and Applications (London: Routledge,
2013), 2.
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democracies in Europe and America. The mainstream studies focus on how
candidates or political parties use marketing tools to communicate with
voters to win elections.9 In the early stages, political campaigns tend to be
episodic, and they are considered only a part of politics.10 As the ﬁeld of
political marketing evolves, politicians learn to campaign continuously to
remain in ofﬁce, especially by employing and generating positive imagery
to maintain the growth and survival of their party, not simply to achieve
victory in an election.11 Hence, political marketing should be not a short-
term tactical device used exclusively to win voters’ support, but may be seen
as a long-term permanent process aiming to ensure governance legitimacy
and party continuity. Some scholars refer to this as a ‘‘permanent cam-
paign.’’12 But it must not be forgotten that one of the important assumptions
behind the above analysis is the existence of a democratic context with fair,
open, and competitive elections.
Political marketing can contribute to a constructive relationship between
political elites and society by maintaining stable support, building up public
trust, and, more importantly, enhancing the legitimacy of a government.13
Speciﬁcally, many academic writers agree that one of the core areas of polit-
ical marketing research is how politicians decide what to offer the public
in relation to public demands.14 It is also important to discuss how govern-
ments plan, design, and take action to achieve their political objectives. In
9. Philip Kotler and Sidney J. Levy, ‘‘Broadening the Concept of Marketing,’’ Journal of
Marketing 33:1 (1969): 10–15; Philip Kotler and Neil Kotler, ‘‘Political Marketing: Generating Effec-
tive Candidates, Campaigns and Causes,’’ in Bruce I. Newman, ed.,Handbook of Political Marketing
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999); Phil Harris, ‘‘Machiavelli, Political Marketing and Reinventing
Government,’’ European Journal of Marketing 35:9/10 (2001): 1136–54.
10. Stephan C. Henneberg and Nicholas J. O’Shaughnessy, ‘‘Theory and Concept Development
in Political Marketing,’’ Journal of Political Marketing 6:2/3 (2007): 5–31.
11. Gary A. Mauser, Political Marketing: An Approach to Campaign Strategy (New York: Praeger,
1983), 11–14.
12. Dan Nimmo, ‘‘The Permanent Campaign: Marketing as a Governing Tool,’’ in Newman,
Handbook of Political Marketing, 73–86; Gareth Smith and Andy Hirst, ‘‘Strategic Political Segmen-
tation: A New Approach for a New Era of Political Marketing,’’ European Journal of Marketing 35:9/
10 (2001): 1058–73; Phil Harris and Andrew Lock, ‘‘‘Mind the Gap’: The Rise of Political Marketing
and a Perspective on its Future Agenda,’’ European Journal of Marketing 44:3/4 (2010): 297–307.
13. Jennifer Lees-Marshment, The Political Marketing Game (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2011), 12–15.
14. Jennifer Lees-Marshment, ‘‘Conclusion: New Directions in Political Marketing Practice,
Political Marketing and Democracy, and Future Trends,’’ in Jennifer Lees-Marshment, ed., Rout-
ledge Handbook of Political Marketing (New York: Routledge, 2012): 368–88, at 370.
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this context, political marketers usually adopt an analytical framework of
three phases: (1) political positioning—using market analysis to identify the
political problem; (2) political brand-building—establishing the political brand
to match the expectations of society; and (3) marketing implementation—
delivering their products in practice to maintain public support.15 These three
phases will be applied later in the case of Macao.
However, political marketing has its own limitations. The concept is
closely linked to psychological factors such as society’s perceptions and degree
of satisfaction. Politicians must know what society wants from them, and
deliver actual policies to achieve their political goals. This mechanism is
fundamental to political marketing and critical for the legitimacy of govern-
ment. Misuse of political marketing strategy, such as a mismatch with ex-
pectations or the outbreak of political scandal, leading to a sharp contrast
between promises and reality, might increase public distrust and further
weaken legitimacy.16 In such cases, society can demand the removal of polit-
ical leaders, or more seriously, push for fundamental and comprehensive
reforms as structural problems in the political system are exposed.
Witnessing the success of political marketing in democracies, leaders of
authoritarian and hybrid regimes have started to borrow the approach to
beneﬁt their own governing. As mentioned by Mauser, ‘‘almost all politicians
use marketing techniques and ideas, but very few wish to admit it openly.’’17
There are increasing numbers of studies whose writers are interested in how
non-democratic governments apply political marketing to respond to public
demands. Shestopal, Pishcheva, Gikavyi, and Zorin conducted a quantitative
survey in Russia and found that President Vladimir Putin has successfully
built up an image of strong leadership that matches mass expectations.
Citizens had formed a favorable view of Putin’s performance and were willing
to follow and believe in him, which led to fewer political conﬂicts with the
government.18 Lee and Willnat examined Singapore and argued that the
ruling People’s Action Party applied political marketing to package itself as
a strong, united government that provides economic and social achievement,
15. Lees-Marshment, Political Marketing Game, 45.
16. Ibid, 217.
17. Mauser, Political Marketing, 83.
18. Elena Borisovna Shestopal, Tat’iana Nikolaevna Pishcheva, Evgenii Miroslavovich Gikavyi,
and Vasilii Anatol’evich Zorin, ‘‘The Image of V.V. Putin in the Consciousness of Russia’s Citizens,’’
Sociological Research 43:6 (2004): 29–56.
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while attacking the opposition as irresponsible opportunists. This strategy
brought a high level of credibility and legitimacy to the party in the short run.
In the long run, however, the people of Singapore grew uncomfortable with
tight political and social control and began to demand political reforms.19
Studies of political marketing have also covered China and Hong Kong.
Sun, for instance, discovered Chinese applications of political marketing,
including image-building for the Chinese Communist Party and top leaders
designed to gain public support and, more important, ensure regime sur-
vival.20 Fong examined the case of Hong Kong and pointed out that Donald
Tsang, its second chief executive, adopted political marketing to brand his
governance as ‘‘pragmatic leadership.’’ Fong found that political marketing
campaigns helped Tsang maintain a high popularity rating in the beginning,
but that he lost support later as the structural legitimacy deﬁcit under the
existing semi-democratic regime of Hong Kong was further exposed.21
To sum up, the results of political marketing in non-democratic or hybrid
regimes tend to be mixed, often showing a positive short-term effect that is
followed by a relatively negative long-term effect. It appears that political
marketing is a double-edged sword. Effective political marketing creates
a positive image of the government,22 contributing to political credibility23
and building up a positive society–government relationship,24 but its failure
can also lead to anger toward and discontent with the political leaders—as
well as with the system governing how those leaders are selected. The ﬁndings
so far tend to suggest a working proposition that the positive effects of
political marketing in non-democracies may have to be accompanied by other
19. Terence Lee and Lars Willnat, ‘‘Media Management and Political Communication in Sin-
gapore,’’ in Lars Willnat and Annette Aw, eds., Political Communication in Asia (New York:
Routledge, 2009): 93–111.
20. Henry H. Sun, ‘‘International Political Marketing: A Case Study of Its Application in
China,’’ Journal of Public Affairs 7:4 (2007): 331–40, at 336.
21. Brian C. H. Fong, ‘‘Political Marketing Campaigns of Chief Executive Donald Tsang: The
Challenges of Managing Legitimacy Deﬁcit under a Semi-democratic Regime,’’ in Joseph Y. S.
Cheng, ed., The Second Chief Executive of Hong Kong SAR: Evaluating the Tsang Years 2005–2012
(Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2013): 113–38.
22. Darren G. Lilleker, ‘‘Political Marketing: The Cause of an Emerging Democratic Deﬁcit in
Britain?’’ in Walter W. Wymer Jr. and Jennifer Lees-Marshment, eds., Current Issues in Political
Marketing (New York: Haworth Press, 2013): 5–26, at 23.
23.Darren G. Lilleker and Nigel Jackson, ‘‘Political Public Relations and Political Marketing,’’ in
Jesper Stro¨mba¨ck and Spiro Kiousis, eds., Political Public Relations: Principles and Applications (New
York: Routledge, 2011): 157–76, at 164.
24. Lees-Marshment, Political Marketing, 7.
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structural and reinforcing factors, such as the establishment of well-
functioning institutions and actual structural reforms meeting public expec-
tations, for the positive effects to be sustainable. This proposition will be
further examined in this case study of Macao.
POLITICAL POSITIONING: IDENTIFYING THE LEGITIMACY GAP IN
THE HYBRID REGIME OF MACAO
The political system of the MSAR can be described as a hybrid regime:
a mixture of democratic and undemocratic elements.25 In contrast to the
British government’s plan for Hong Kong (the other SAR), during the hand-
over negotiation period the Portuguese government did not insist on pro-
moting democratization in Macao, due to consideration of the Chinese
market and reactions of the Chinese government.26 The Macao Basic Law,
the mini-constitution of Macao, clearly reﬂects the Beijing government’s lack
of enthusiasm for democratization there, when compared with Hong Kong.
According to Article 45 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, the ultimate goal of the
chief executive election is selection by universal suffrage. There is no such
commitment in the Macao Basic Law.27 Similarly, there is nothing like
Article 68 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, stipulating the ultimate goal of
election of all legislators by universal suffrage. The Basic Law of Macao only
states that the majority of the legislators shall be ‘‘elected.’’28 In fact, the
selection of the chief executive and the legislators is dominated by pro-
Beijing forces. Currently, the chief executive is elected by a 400-member
election committee, whose members are selected by pro-Beijing associations.
In the Legislative Assembly, the pro-Beijing forces have fully controlled the
indirect seats through those pro-China groups and appointed enough seats
through nominations of the chief executive to gain an absolute majority.
25. Eilo Wing Yat Yu, ‘‘Executive-Legislative Relationships and the Development of Public
Policy,’’ in Newman M. K. Lam and Ian Scott, eds., Gaming, Governance and Public Policy in Macao
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011): 57–74, at 73; Mathew Y. H. Wong, ‘‘Party Models
in a Hybrid Regime: Hong Kong 2007–2012,’’ China Review 15:1 (2015): 67–94; Ying-ho Kwong,
‘‘Ruling Coalition Restructuring under Macao’s Hybrid Regime,’’ China Review (forthcoming).
26. Sonny Shiu Hing Lo, Political Development in Macau (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press,
1995), 23; Wai-man Lam, ‘‘Political Context,’’ in Wai-man Lam, Percy Lui, and Wilson Wong, eds.,
Contemporary Hong Kong Politics (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 2012): 1–22, at 3.
27. Yash Ghai, ‘‘The Basic Law of the Special Administrative Region of Macau: Some Reﬂec-
tions,’’ International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49:1 (2000): 183–98, at 191.
28. Ibid., 191.
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Therefore, the general public is either excluded or marginalized from select-
ing their chief executive and a large number of members in the legislature,
although various civil liberties have been guaranteed for Macao under the
Basic Law. In maintaining certain civil liberties and some limited elements of
democratic elections, Macao should be classiﬁed as a hybrid regime.
Fernando Chui was the only candidate in the chief executive election in
2009. Even so, due to the weak procedural legitimacy of the Macao govern-
ment and the declining legitimacy inherited from his predecessor, Edmund
Ho Hau-wah, Chui had an urgent need to provide better performance as
soon as he assumed ofﬁce. One of his main aims was to improve state–society
relations and enhance legitimacy through political marketing. In political
marketing, political positioning is the ﬁrst step in assessing where a govern-
ment or politician is in relation to the public and considering how to respond
to them. In choosing their political positioning, the political elite resembles
merchants selling hope to ‘‘targeted customers.’’29 As the head of Macao, the
chief executive has to serve at least two ‘‘customers’’: the nation of China and
the Macao people. On the one hand, the chief executive had to design
political strategies to show his capacity to govern, his loyalty, and his com-
mitment to the Chinese leaders. On the other hand, he needed to win public
support in Macao. The political positioning adopted by Fernando Chui can
be analyzed as a series of responses designed to simultaneously please the
Chinese leadership and the Macao people.
With the announcement of the Scientiﬁc Outlook on Development in
2003, former Chinese President Hu Jintao launched a series of new policies to
improve the governance capacity of local governments; one of the key policies
was the Sunshine Law. On January 17, 2007, the State Council promulgated
the Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the Disclosure of
Government Information at its 165th executive meeting; it came into force
May 1, 2008. This regulation, according to Article 1, is designed to protect
legal access to government information by citizens, legal persons, and other
organizations; improve the transparency of government work; promote admin-
istration according to law; and give full play to the role of government infor-
mation in serving the people’s production, living, and social and economic
activities. Under the principle of One Country, Two Systems, the MSAR
29. Wojciech Cwalina, Andrzej Falkowski, and Bruce I. Newman, Political Marketing: Theo-
retical and Strategic Foundations (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe), 16.
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government had no obligation to implement this regulation, but Fernando
Chui still put some of its principles into his ﬁrst policy address. Presumably, he
wished to show that he was following national policy direction and could
implement those policies in the MSAR, assuring the central leaders that he
was a good choice.30
Chui’s predecessor Edmund Ho, who took ofﬁce in 1999, enjoyed a high
level of satisfaction from the local community in his ﬁrst term (1999–
2005). The turning point of the decline of legitimacy under his leadership
came in his second term, after a series of policy failures, corruption cases,
and political scandals. Overspending for the East Asian Games and the
case of Ao Man-long were two signiﬁcant cases that exposed the problems
of ‘‘black box operation’’ and ‘‘unclean government’’ in Macao.31 On
November 2, 2006, the Commission of Audit released an investigative
report on the Fourth East Asian Games, which had been held in late
October 2005. The report found that the MSAR government spent around
4.4 billion Macanese patacas (MOP) (US$ 550 million) to hold the games,
exceeding the budget by 50.6%.32 This sparked outrage from legislators,
especially opposition ones, and public concern regarding the waste of
public money, poor budget planning, and lack of public oversight and
accountability of the MSAR government. Many commentators also criti-
cized the ‘‘black box decision-making’’ and non-transparency of the Macao
government.33
Another major case was the corruption scandal of Ao Man-long in 2006.
Ao, the former secretary for transport and public works, was bribed by
contractors and land developers to use his discretionary power to favor their
companies with government projects and grants of government land.34 Ao
was arrested, found guilty, and sentenced to 27 years for taking bribes and
30. Jiazeng Li, ‘‘Yangguang zhengfu de benzhi tezheng yu Aomen tequ zhengfu de nuli fang-
xiang’’ [Essential Characteristics of a ‘‘Sunshine Government’’ and the Future Direction for the
Macao SAR Government], inWan Chong Ieong, ed., Yangguang Zhengfu yu Gongmin Shehui Jianshe
Xueshu Yantaohui Lunwen Ji [Conference Paper of Sunshine Government and Civil Society Develop-
ment] (Macao: One Country Two Systems Research Centre, 2010): 28–36, at 28–29.
31. Eilo Wing-Yat Yu, ‘‘Formal and Informal Politics in Macao Special Administrative Region
Elections,’’ Journal of Contemporary China 16:52 (2007): 417–41.
32. ‘‘Dongyayun 44 yi hunzhang’’ [Confusing Budget of East Asia Games], Macao Daily News,
November 2, 2006, P01.
33. Lo, ‘‘One Formula, Two Experiences,’’ 364.
34. Eilo Wing-Yat Yu, ‘‘Anti-Corruption Approaches in Macao: Lawmaking and Legal Enforce-
ment,’’ Journal of Contemporary China 22:79 (2013): 93–108.
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laundering money worth MOP 800 million (US$ 100 million).35 This scan-
dal was described as ‘‘the most serious corruption of the century,’’ and it
greatly damaged the legitimacy of Ho’s government. Public grievances and
anger sent the people of Macao out into the streets to protest Ho’s poor
governance. On May 1, 2007, 10,000 demonstrators joined a protest against
the MSAR government, and a police ofﬁcer ﬁred three shots into the air during
a confrontation between police and protesters, shocking the entire territory.36
After that, the May First protest became a major annual event expressing local
distrust and disapproval of the MSAR government. All these policy failures
undermined public conﬁdence in Ho’s governing capacity and generated wide-
spread dissatisfaction and frustration in the local community.37
In general, surveys showed a decline of legitimacy under Edmund Ho’s
governance (Figure 1). In his ﬁrst term (2000–05), net satisfaction was stable
and high, at 60%–70%. It averaged 60%–80% most of the time, and less
than 10% were dissatisﬁed. However, the situation changed during his second
term (2006–10) after a series of political scandals and massive demonstrations.
Between 2006 and 2007, satisfaction fell sharply, and Ho never regained his
popularity. Opinion surveys showed the number of people dissatisﬁed with
his overall performance increased incrementally, while the number satisﬁed
became unstable. Edmund Ho’s second term reﬂected a decline in legiti-
macy; it was crucial for Chui to stop the decline and ﬁnd a way to recover.
Speciﬁcally, public opinion polls indicated that a large number of respon-
dents demanded a more transparent government in Macao. Some 65% de-
manded the establishment of a ‘‘sunshine government’’ to improve
transparency, which people considered the ﬁrst priority for the new Fernando
Chui administration.38 Also, the Macao people have long considered public
consultation one of the most important elements of a government.39 These
35. Bill K. P. Chou, ‘‘Implementation Measures of China’s Macao Policies,’’ Chinese Law and
Government 45:5 (2012): 3–9, at 3.
36. Sonny Shiu Hing Lo, Political Change in Macao (London: Routledge, 2008), 65.
37. C. S. Bryan Ho, ‘‘Political Culture, Social Movements, and Governability in Macao,’’ Asian
Affairs 38:2 (2011): 59–87.
38. One Country Two Systems Research Institute, ‘‘Yangguang zhengfu yu yangguang shehui’’
[Sunshine Government and Sunshine Society], Research on One Country Two Systems 7 (2010): 41–57,
at 41.
39. Herbert Yee, Sheng Hua Lou, and Cheuk Wah Chan, Aomen Huaren Zhengzhi Zongxiang
Yanjiu [Longitudinal Research on the Political Culture of Macao] (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing
(HK), 2011), 95.
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expectations played a decisive role in inﬂuencing the political positioning of
Chui’s government.
POLITICAL BRAND-BUILDING: ‘‘SUNSHINE GOVERNMENT’’ AND
‘‘SCIENTIFIC ADMINISTRATION’’
Fernando Chui assumed ofﬁce on December 20, 2009 facing the urgent task
of restoring public support and legitimacy post-Edmund Ho. Ho was orig-
inally perceived as an effective leader, well honed for political leadership
under the wing of his late father, Ho Yin, a long-time leader of the Chinese
community in Macao.40 Chui and his family also held a leading role in the
Chinese community and were trusted political allies of Beijing. However,
figure 1. People’s Satisfaction with Overall Performance of the MSAR Government,
1999–2014
SOURCE: ‘‘Survey on Public Satisfaction with the Overall Performance of MSAR Government,’’ Public
Opinion Program, University of Hong Kong, December 19, 2014, <http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/
popexpress/macau/govSat/datatables.html>, accessed December 20, 2014.
40. Alex H. Choi, ‘‘Intergovernmental Relations between Mainland China and the Macao SAR,’’
in Evan M. Berman, ed., Public Administration in Southeast Asia: Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia,
Hong Kong, and Macao (New York: CRC Press, 2011): 475–99, at 481.
774  ASIAN SURVEY 57:4
given the declining legitimacy and the changing political circumstances in
Macao, a simple political brand of a strong and traditional leader trusted by
Beijing was no longer sufﬁcient. Starting with his election campaign, Chui
promised to establish an open, transparent, and deliberative government.
Consistent with his political marketing strategy, Chui made use of various
methods to interact with the public to explain his policies, including holding
media sessions, delivering public speeches, and conducting community visits.
Table 1 compares the political marketing activities of Ho and Chui. Fernando
Chui was obviously more active. He continued his brand-building after being
re-elected in 2015, when he made 14 public speeches, held 35 press conferences
or media sessions, and undertook seven community visits and social activities.
With this increased and active communication with society, Chui at-
tempted to imprint his ‘‘political brands’’ in the minds of the Macao people.
Political branding provides a summary for the public of the government’s
image.41 To construct a positive relationship and address the public concerns
raised during his predecessor’s administration, Chui designed two political
brands, ‘‘sunshine government’’ and ‘‘scientiﬁc administration,’’ to integrate
his political philosophy and satisfy public demand.
Chui also presented his ideas in his ﬁrst policy address in 2010 and ex-
pounded his political message, deﬁning ‘‘sunshine government’’ and ‘‘scien-
tiﬁc administration.’’ With regard to ‘‘sunshine government,’’ Chui expressed
his belief that:
table 1. Political Marketing Activities in Macao, from Handover to December 19,
2014
Political marketing activities
Edmund Ho
1st term
(Dec. 1999–2004)
Edmund Ho
2nd term
(Dec. 2004–09)
Fernando Chui
1st term
(Dec. 2009–14)
Media sessions 78 76 145
Public speeches 97 120 154
Community visits 30 29 39
Total 205 225 338
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis, based on information from the Chief Executive Office (http://www.gce.gov.
mo) and the Government Information Bureau (http://www.gcs.gov.mo).
41. Kenneth M. Cosgrove, ‘‘Political Branding in the Modern Age: Effective Strategies, Tools
and Techniques,’’ in Lees-Marshment, Routledge Handbook of Political Marketing, 107–23, at 107.
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Using ofﬁcial websites of different departments and media means, the govern-
ment has to provide adequate information accessibility and more communica-
tion channels to accept monitoring by both the public and the mass media.
Furthermore, we will establish the Ofﬁce of the Government Spokesman to offer
regular information and news announcement sessions. We want to protect the
right of the public to information, better explain policy proposals to them, and
enhance our policy coordination with society. By improving policy effectiveness
and transparency, we can achieve the target of public affairs accessibility and
establish a ‘‘sunshine government.’’42
From this point of view, the key to ‘‘sunshine government’’ was enhancing
both transparency and the accessibility of government information by offering
more platforms to the public. Chui also spoke of ‘‘scientiﬁc administration’’:
Scientiﬁc administration is an important method to enhance governance
capacity. In the policymaking process, we need to broaden our mind, collect
public opinions, and listen to different sectors to achieve democratic decision-
making. Hence, the MSAR government will set up an Ofﬁce of Policy
Research, which is accountable to the Chief Executive for conducting con-
sultations, assisting different policy bureaus, and facilitating the Chief Execu-
tive in comprehending public opinion.43
In this address, the core concept of ‘‘scientiﬁc administration’’ refers to an
emphasis of government on conducting consultations and incorporating
public opinion into policymaking. After the announcement of his political
brands, Chui made use of every public occasion to present and restate them.
Table 2 shows that ‘‘consultative’’ and ‘‘sunshine’’ government are the
repeated themes of Chui’s political rhetoric. When he attends media sessions,
delivers public speeches, and gives policy addresses, he frequently uses the
words ‘‘scientiﬁc’’ or ‘‘consultative’’ and ‘‘sunshine’’ or ‘‘transparent’’ to pro-
mote his political brand and establish an image of his governing style ﬁrmly in
the minds of the Macao people.
In his new term beginning in 2014, promoting these two political brands
remained an important task. In 2015, Chui used the words ‘‘scientiﬁc’’ and
‘‘consultation’’ 13 times and the words ‘‘transparency’’ and ‘‘sunshine’’ four
times in marketing events. Similarly, he always used the policy address as an
42. Authors’ translation. Macao SAR Government, Policy Address for the Fiscal Year 2010 (Macao,
2010), 33–34.
43. Authors’ translation. Ibid, 22.
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important platform to bolster his brands. In 2015, he mentioned ‘‘scientiﬁc’’
and ‘‘consultation’’ 106 times, and ‘‘transparency’’ and ‘‘sunshine’’ 13 times, in
this document.
POLITICAL MARKETING IMPLEMENTATION: STRENGTHENING
TRANSPARENCY AND DELIBERATION
Chui created a series of policies to implement these political brands and
realize his ruling philosophies. To begin with, he set up the Ofﬁce of the
Government Spokesman to speed up policy responses to the public and
establish a communication mechanism with the media.44 The MSAR gov-
ernment further committed to the creation of more resources for personnel
training and to delivering administrative and emergent information to
the public more actively to increase access to and release of government
information.45 Since its establishment, the ofﬁce has made more than 270
announcements, including via press conferences, press releases, and media
sessions.
Second, the administration continued to press for greater transparency in
other areas, notably the income and interests of high-ranking ofﬁcials. In
table 2. Content Analysis of Fernando Chui’s Political Branding, from Handover
to December 19, 2014
Political marketing activities
Fernando Chui
1st term
(Dec. 2009–14)
Occurrence of
keywords ‘‘scientific’’
and ‘‘consultation’’
Occurrence of
keywords ‘‘sunshine’’
and ‘‘transparency’’
Policy address 5 389 90
Media sessions 145 35 12
Public speeches 154 70 41
Total 304 494 143
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis, based on information from the Chief Executive Office (http://www.gce.gov.
mo), Government Information Bureau (http://www.gcs.gov.mo), and Policy Address (http://www.
policyaddress.gov.mo/policy/home.php?). The essence of the content analysis was to scan all the political
rhetoric made by Edmund Ho and Fernando Chui and then to determine the frequency of the keywords
‘‘scientific’’ (ke xue), ‘‘consultation’’ (zi xun), ‘‘sunshine’’ (yang guang), and ‘‘transparency’’ (tou ming) in the
political rhetoric of each.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., 28.
WONG AND KWONG / MACAO’S LEGITIMACY GAP  777
2003, the Hong Kong South China Morning Post revealed that Edmund Ho
was one of the shareholders of a listed company but had failed to report his
proﬁts in accordance with the Patrimonial Declaration of Incomes and Inter-
ests. Because of his special status, he was not investigated or charged by any
department.46 But the public was deeply disappointed. Learning from Ho’s
lesson, Chui reformed the former Declaration of Incomes and Interests
system to the Legal Regime of Declaration of Assets and Interests (a new
sunshine law) to meet the public expectation. High-ranking ofﬁcials, includ-
ing the chief executive and principal ofﬁcials, executive councilors, legislators,
and so on, must declare their assets and interests for public scrutiny.47 Offer-
ing this system of open information from 2013, Chui believed he could
improve the image of government and regain public trust.
Third, on August 5, 2011, he implemented the Guideline on Policy Con-
sultation Regulations, which aimed to enhance the quality of consultations
for public participation in governance. ‘‘Consultation’’ for Chui refers to
setting a formal mechanism to collect public opinion, and the guideline set
up several important principles for future consultation. It required various
government departments to release consultation information, to establish
a convenient platform for information delivery and collection, and to
strengthen interaction among consultative committees, different social orga-
nizations, and stakeholders, with the ultimate goal of improving transparency
and responsiveness.48 Based on those principles, government departments
would conduct consultations and collect public opinion on their policymak-
ing. Table 3 surveys the number of published consultation documents issued
by Edmund Ho and Fernando Chui since Handover. The number published
by Chui’s administration is nearly double that published during Ho’s second
term. It appears that Chui is courting an image of being an open-minded
leader who welcomes public opinion and discussion. Since his re-election in
2014, the emphasis on consultation has remained crucial. In 2015, the MSAR
government released 14 consultation documents.
Interest group politics is a major characteristic of the government of Macao
because pro-China groups, especially business chambers, labor unions, and
46. Bruce K. K. Kwong, ‘‘Public Ethics and Corruption in Macao,’’ in Berman, Public Adminis-
tration in Southeast Asia, 501–18, at 513.
47. Commission against Corruption, ‘‘Declaration of Assets and Interest: Related Issues,’’
<http://www.ccac.org.mo/dbpi/index_e.html>, accessed December 15, 2014.
48. Macao SAR Government, Policy Address for the Fiscal Year 2012 (Macao, 2011), 138.
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grass-roots associations, have inﬂuenced policy outcomes.49 The MSAR
government has held regular meetings and consulted these special interest
groups to understand their stances and needs. According to political scien-
tist Eilo Yu, Edmund Ho, as a leader who emphasized rule by virtue and
strong leadership, made good use of ‘‘informal politics,’’ i.e., cronyism or
guanxi [connections] networks, to resolve sociopolitical conﬂict and ten-
sions.50 However, these types of networks have been denounced as ‘‘black
box operations’’ because the general public was mostly uninformed and
excluded.51
As interest group politics endured within Macao’s governance, Chui deftly
packaged it as ‘‘open’’ and publicly announced activities under his brand of
‘‘sunshine government.’’ In the Ho era, these meetings and discussions
between the chief executive and various interest groups were less likely to
be mentioned in ofﬁcial news releases. But Chui used the concept of focus
group discussions and openly announced invitations to various social groups
for in-depth consultation and discussion, reducing the perception that he was
using ‘‘black box operations.’’ As shown in Table 4, Chui announced such
meetings more frequently than did Ho. Indeed, not only pro-Beijing associa-
tions and representatives, but also opposition groups were annually invited by
Chui to share their opinions. This kind of group meeting continued to be
used in 2015 and 2016: 54 and 37 focus group meetings were reported on the
ofﬁcial website for these years, respectively.
table 3. Content Analysis of Published Consultation Documents, from Handover
to December 19, 2014
Term Number of published documents
Edmund Ho 1st term (Dec. 1999–2004) 9
Edmund Ho 2nd term (Dec. 2004–09) 27
Fernando Chui 1st term (Dec. 2009–14) 53
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis, based on information from Policy Consultation (http://portal.gov.mo/web/
guest/info_detail?infoid¼91143) and the Government Information Bureau (http://www.gcs.gov.mo).
49. Bill K. P. Chou, ‘‘Interest Group Politics in Macau after Handover,’’ Journal of Contemporary
China 14:43 (2005): 191–206, at 191–92; Choi, ‘‘Intergovernmental Relations,’’ 489.
50. Yu, ‘‘Formal and Informal Politics,’’ 441.
51. Ibid., 436–37.
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POLITICAL MARKETING AND PERFORMANCE-BUILDING: OLD
WINE IN A NEW BOTTLE?
Given the non-democratic nature of the MSAR, as in many hybrid regimes,
any chief executive—not just Edmund Ho or Fernando Chui—would have
to rely heavily on ‘‘performance legitimacy’’ to maintain the governability of
Macao. Lo and Yee found that Edmund Ho used civil service reform and new
constitutional conventions in his attempt to address the public maladmin-
istration of the Portuguese colonial government and improve the image of
the MSAR government.52 Chou draws a similar conclusion in his study of
the MSAR government, concluding that it relied on public-sector reforms
to provide administrative efﬁciency and on performance to tackle political
problems.53 Eilo Yu discussed the MSAR government’s reform of anti-
corruption measures to present an image of clean government to enhance
its legitimacy.54
This political formula of promising the introduction or delivery of some
piecemeal democratic elements such as anti-corruption, accountability, or
efﬁciency in government performance to replace structural political reform
is commonly used by non-democratic regimes to enhance their legitimacy
and maintain the continuity of their rule.55 Expanding a certain number of
democratic elements fulﬁlls a myriad of political functions, which include
table 4. Content Analysis of Reported Focus Group Discussions in Macao, from
Handover to December 19, 2014
Term Number of reported focus group discussions
Edmund Ho 1st term (Dec. 1999–2004) 10
Edmund Ho 2nd term (Dec. 2004–09) 21
Fernando Chui 1st term (Dec. 2009–14) 155
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis, based on information from the Chief Executive Office (http://www.gce.gov.
mo) and the Government Information Bureau (http://www.gcs.gov.mo).
52. Sonny S. H. Lo and Herbert S. Yee, ‘‘Legitimacy-Building in the Macau Special Adminis-
trative Region: Colonial Legacies and Reform Strategies,’’ Asian Journal of Political Science 13:1 (2005):
51–79.
53. Bill K. P. Chou, ‘‘Legitimacy-Building and Public Sector Reform in Macao: Administrative
Measures to Address Political Problems,’’ China: An International Journal 10:3 (2012): 133–48, at 133.
54. Yu, ‘‘Anti-Corruption Approaches.’’
55. Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010).
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displaying an internationally positive image,56 enhancing government legiti-
macy,57 dividing the power of opposition forces,58 and buying time to post-
pone full democracy.59 This strategy was also adopted in mainland China by
the Chinese central government. Fewsmith concluded that the governing
strategy of China could be characterized as still mainly one of ‘‘consultative
authoritarianism,’’ which fulﬁlls only a showcase function while avoiding
institutional reforms.60
Macao, as an SAR of China, followed the same governance logic: it prom-
ised to build a ‘‘sunshine government’’ and ‘‘scientiﬁc administration’’ to
expand a certain number of democratic elements, but resisted any major
political reform. Although Fernando Chui intended to use political market-
ing to gain public support, public satisfaction did not rise but fell even
further. Figure 2 shows the number of social movements, such as protests,
sit-ins, and assemblies, reported by local newspapers since Handover. It was
evident that the overall trend of reported social movements was increasing
and people were more participative in the expression of their dissatisfaction
through collective action in areas ranging from speciﬁc labor to welfare
policies. People were also more active in joining protests in favor of more
democratic reform generally. Except for the ﬁrst year of Chui’s administra-
tion, which may be taken as a honeymoon period, the trend of increasing
numbers of social movements seen under Ho’s administration (2000–09)
continued under Chui’s second administration (2010–14). In other words,
the public was increasingly dissatisﬁed with many political and social issues,
and the decline in government legitimacy was never reversed.
It is often tough for an authoritarian or hybrid regime to deliver performance
outcomes and provide democratic elements, including respect for civil rights
and toleration of liberty, without the necessary corresponding structural re-
forms. Even worse, frequent promises to expand or introduce certain demo-
cratic elements in authoritarian regimes will further raise public expectations of
56. Staffan I. Lindberg, ‘‘Introduction,’’ in Staffan I. Lindberg, ed., Democratization by Elections:
A New Mode of Transition (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009): 1–21.
57. William Case, ‘‘Hybrid Politics and New Competitiveness: Hong Kong’s 2007 Chief
Executive Election,’’ East Asia 25:4 (2008): 365–88, at 365.
58. Andreas Schedler, ‘‘Sources of Competition under Electoral Authoritarianism,’’ in Lindberg,
Democratization by Elections, 179–245.
59. Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington,
DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).
60. Fewsmith, Logic and Limits, 175.
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full democracy, or at least something closer to it. When the public realizes that
an authoritarian regime is making false and insincere promises, they might feel
frustrated and angry, which may consolidate and deepen their desire for com-
prehensive political reform.
In Macao, on the one hand, Chui’s carefully designed political marketing
strategies did not address the problem of the structural legitimacy deﬁcit under
the current political system. On the other hand, as new policies focused more
on public relations than on policy substance, the lack of authentic improve-
ment in performance further increased public dissatisfaction with the MSAR
government (Figure 1). Clearly, by 2013 satisfaction with Chui was even lower
than with Edmund Ho. Political marketing did not help Chui regain public
support or raise it to the level enjoyed by Ho’s administration.
In 2014, net satisfaction, the difference between positive and negative ratings,
broke a record, falling to only 1.6%. Although the value increased a bit, to 6%,
in 2015, the alarm is still sounding. Figure 3 shows public satisfaction with the
figure 2. Number of Reported Social Movements outside the MSAR Government’s Office
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis, based on the information obtained from theWiseNews electronic database. The
research conducted counted the number of newspaper reports that mentioned social movements in Macao
from 2000 to 2014. The local newspapers covered in this research are Exmoo News, Hou Kong Daily, Jornal
Cheng Pou, Shimin Daily, Jornal Informaça˜o, Jornal San Wau Ou, Jornal Va Kio, Macao Daily News and Tai
Chung Pou.
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MSAR government’s performance in the pace of democratic development from
2000 to 2014. Overall, the Macao people were increasingly dissatisﬁed. In 2014,
this net value also broke a record, falling to –9.4%. In a 2015 survey overall net
satisfaction had returned to positive territory, at 1.6% (and it rose to 13.8% in
2016), but satisfaction with democratic development was still in question.
As a hybrid regime, the political system of the MSAR combines both
democratic and undemocratic elements. However, despite the existence of
some democratic elements, the inﬂuence of ordinary citizens on politics is
still very limited. Less than half of the seats in the legislature are democrat-
ically elected. The Legislative Assembly has three categories of members: 14
directly elected by all registered voters, 12 elected indirectly (through nego-
tiation and compromise by pro-Beijing associations), and seven appointed by
the chief executive.61 In this executive-led system, the chief executive of
figure 3. People’s Satisfaction with the MSAR Government’s Performance on the Pace of
Democratic Development, 1999–2014
SOURCE: ‘‘Survey on Public Satisfaction with the Overall Performance of MSAR Government,’’ Public
Opinion Program, University of Hong Kong, December 19, 2014, <http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/
popexpress/macau/govSat/datatables.html>, accessed December 20, 2014.
NOTE: Data for 2003–2005 and 2011 are not available.
61. Eilo Wing Yat Yu, ‘‘Macao’s ‘One Country, Two Systems’: High Autonomy or Intervention?’’
in Ray Yep, ed., Negotiating Autonomy in Greater China: Hong Kong and Its Sovereign before and after
1997 (Denmark: NIAS Press, 2013): 207–41, at 221–23.
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Macao enjoys enormous constitutional power. Ironically, the chief executive
has a much smaller degree of electoral representation and public mandate,
because he is elected by a 400-member election committee highly inﬂuenced
by the political elite and pro-Beijing forces. Then, ultimately, he is appointed
by the Central People’s Government.62
Macao can be considered a hybrid regime that leans toward the authori-
tarian side rather than the democratic, and has a long way to go in approach-
ing full democracy. The fall of satisfaction in both overall performance and
democratic development shows that the problem of declining legitimacy
cannot be effectively dealt with by political marketing only. The continued
poor performance of the MSAR government, such as corruption scandals and
over-spending of public funds, has made the public increasingly aware of the
need for structural reforms. As mentioned before, massive social movements
such as the Labor Day protests in 2006 and 2007 under Ho’s administration
reliably indicate the sinking legitimacy of the MSAR government. The case of
the welfare package for chief executives and principal ofﬁcials (described
below) was one of the landmark cases of Chui’s ﬁrst term that led to this
public awakening.63 It highlighted the lack of authenticity of the political
marketing strategies and the fact that improving government performance
without institutional political reform was a false hope. The gap between the
promises of political marketing and the actual performance of the government
gradually evolved from low performance legitimacy (which emphasizes gov-
ernment performance) into procedural legitimacy (which concerns the proce-
dures for choosing the government), as citizens questioned the capacity of the
existing political institutions to deliver the performance they demanded.
The Welfare Package for Chief Executives and Principal Officials
The controversy surrounding the Welfare Package for Designated, Incum-
bent and Former Chief Executives and Principal Ofﬁcials bill (hereafter, the
welfare package) in May 2014 illustrated how clearly the public realized that
the widespread political marketing campaigns by Chui’s administration
amounted only to public relations and further exposed the problem of the
structural legitimacy deﬁcit. This welfare package was controversial in two
62. Ibid.
63. Ying Ho Kwong, ‘‘Protest against the Welfare Package for Chief Executives and Principal
Ofﬁcials: Macao’s Political Awaking,’’ China Perspectives 2014:4 (2014): 61–65.
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major aspects. The ﬁrst was the spending of public funds. The package
proposed that former or retired chief executives should receive a monthly
payment equal to 70% of their last monthly salary before leaving ofﬁce.
Antonio Ng Kuok-cheong, an opposition legislator, noted that Chui would
receive more than MOP 6 million (US$ 750,000) if the bill was passed. The
nine principal ofﬁcials would be given one-off compensation of 14% (in the
case of former civil servants) or 30% (for those from the private sector) of
their monthly salary, to be multiplied by the number of months they had
worked for the government. The provisions were retroactive to the year 2000,
which meant that former chief executives and top ofﬁcials would all enjoy the
beneﬁts. The second controversy was that the bill would give the chief
executive immunity from criminal prosecution during his term of ofﬁce.
The welfare package drew ﬁerce opposition from society, particularly from
the opposition camps and youth associations. The opposition claimed that
the bill was tailor-made for the ofﬁcials’ own beneﬁt and denounced it as self-
serving. Even worse, this bill had been introduced without any public con-
sultation. The chief executive’s potential immunity from criminal charges
sparked concerns that the head of the MSAR would be above the law. (The
government has never explained why the chief executive should enjoy this
privilege.) This welfare package made the public realize that the government
was insincere about public consultation even in the case of a highly contro-
versial issue, and showed that the problem of ‘‘black box operation,’’ which
dated back to the previous administration, remained unresolved. It convinced
the public that the political marketing efforts of the MSAR government
amounted to theater, bringing no real change and no true commitment from
the government.
The widespread dissatisfaction and anger caused by the welfare package
accumulated and grew quickly. On May 25, 2014, about 20,000 Macao
people marched to and protested at the government headquarters. (The
police put the ﬁgure at only 7,000.) It was regarded as the biggest demon-
stration since Handover. Protestors held signs and chanted slogans such as
‘‘Abuse of power,’’ ‘‘The government neglects public opinion,’’ and ‘‘Ofﬁcials
care for themselves’’ throughout the demonstration, urging the government
to withdraw the package. That night, Florinda Chan Lai-Man, the secretary
for administration and justice, released a statement that the government
proposed that the bill should be ‘‘reanalyzed’’ in the Legislative Assembly.
The organizers replied that they were urging retraction, not reanalysis, and
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threatened to organize another protest. Two days later, the activist group
Macau Conscience estimated that 7,000 people answered their call to attend
a sit-in protest to surround the Legislative Assembly (the police put the
number at 4,900). Finally, all the legislators (except the president) attended
a meeting that day and afﬁrmed the request that the government restudy the
bill. After that, Chui announced that he had decided to scrap the bill.64 He
further insisted that the government would advance with a new proposal
‘‘only with the people’s agreement’’ and promised to use multiple channels
such as media, lectures, explanatory sessions, and reﬂections from legislators
to collect feedback.65
After this incident, Macau Conscience, the key organizer of the protest
movement, declared that the welfare package protest campaign clearly
exposed the problem of an undemocratic system in Macao. It declared that
Macao needs a democratic system and universal suffrage to make a real
accountable, transparent, and consultative government. In late August
2014, Macau Conscience and two youth associations formed a joint committee
and launched a civil referendum to understand public opinion on democracy.
Drawing from the Occupy Central with Love and Peace June poll in 2014 in
Hong Kong, the civil referendum asked the Macao people, ‘‘Do you want
universal suffrage in the next Chief Executive Election?’’ and ‘‘Do you have
conﬁdence in Fernando Chui?’’66 A total of 8,688 residents voted in the civil
referendum. Of this number, 95% said yes to the ﬁrst question, and 89% said
no to the second.67 But despite this strong public disapproval, on August 31,
2014, Chui was re-elected, with 96% of the votes of the Election Committee.
The reaction to the welfare package demonstrated that the political market-
ing employed by Chui’s government was a failure. Although he expended
much effort to invent his political brands of ‘‘sunshine government’’ and
‘‘scientiﬁc administration,’’ the gap between actual performance and public
expectations remained. His administration ended up with even less legitimacy
64. Tou Ian Sio, ‘‘Lawmakers Propose to Discuss ‘Golden Handshake’ Bill Again,’’ Macau Post
Daily, May 26, 2014, P04.
65. Grace Yu, ‘‘Chui Withdraws Compensation Bill to ‘Listen to the People,’’’ Macau Daily
Times, May 30, 2014, <http://macaudailytimes.com.mo/archive-2009-2014/macau/53226-chui-
withdraws-compensation-bill-to-’’listen-to-the-people’’.html>, accessed November 25, 2014.
66. Stuart Lau, ‘‘Macau Unofﬁcial Democracy Poll Halted as Police Detain Five Activists,’’ South
China Morning Post, August 25, 2014, ED 1.
67. Jefﬁe Lam, ‘‘90 pc Don’t Trust Macau Leader, Says ‘Referendum,’’’ South China Morning
Post, September 3, 2014, City 3.
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than the previous administration. Also, the public had greater awareness of the
structural problems of the non-democratic system in Macao, and voiced
a stronger demand for democracy in society. Chui himself also paid a heavy
political price in terms of his credibility and public image, making his efforts to
govern much more difﬁcult in his second term.
As long as this structural source of legitimacy deﬁcit in Macao remains
unsolved, any government’s decision may rapidly lead to another political
incident. Besides, the protest against the welfare package has ﬁnally evolved
into a demand for democratization, which is a challenge to the legitimacy of
the existing governing institutions. This clearly shows that the implications
and impacts of the movement go beyond dissatisfaction with a particular
policy or incident, and should be taken as a general democratic movement
calling for more fundamental institutional changes. Without such a reform, it
could be difﬁcult to mitigate the root problem and it might not be long
before dissatisfaction erupts over another unpopular policy.
In May 2016, it was reported by the Chinese media that the MSAR
government would donate RMB 100 million (US$ 14.7 million) through the
Macao Foundation to Jinan University in Guangzhou to construct a media
studies center and two Hong Kong-Macao student halls. The Macao Foun-
dation was basically set up by the government in 2001 and funded by 1.6% of
the gross revenues of Macao’s casinos to subsidize community services. The
MSAR government claimed that Macao had a patriotic responsibility to
contribute to the country’s development and to enhance education services
in the motherland. But the opposition claimed that the Macao Foundation
held a lot of public money and the subsidy application procedures were
‘‘black box-based.’’68
A total of 17 groups called for a large-scale demonstration, with the aim of
putting pressure on the Macao Foundation to withdraw the donation to
Jinan University and urging the government to improve transparency and
fulﬁll its promise of becoming a ‘‘sunshine government.’’ Some groups also
called for Chui’s resignation because of the abuse of public funds.69 We can
see that when Chui failed to fulﬁll his promises, negative rhetoric such as
68. ‘‘Groups Should Improve Transparency on Subsidies: FM Chief,’’Macau Post Daily, May 31,
2016, P02.
69. ‘‘100 Million Yuan Isn’t Much for a University: Tam Groups Call for Axing of Donation to
Jinan Uni,’’ Macau Post Daily, May 10, 2016, P02.
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‘‘making fake promises’’ spread through the society and became a political
burden on the MSAR government.
CONCLUSION
Although studies have substantiated the effect of political marketing in inﬂu-
encing elections and campaigns in Western democracies,70 it is still doubtful
whether its effect can be as valid and signiﬁcant when it is applied outside its
original democratic context. Even so, it is increasingly common for hybrid or
even authoritarian regimes to use political marketing strategies and techni-
ques to enhance their legitimacy, narrowing the legitimacy gap. Recent lit-
erature has also shown that Chinese leaders have used political marketing to
present a positive image to the people with the aim of sustaining the stability
of the authoritarian regime in China.
This article presents political marketing from a comparative perspective to
test whether it can be applied across regime types and political settings. It
examines the relationship between political marketing and legitimacy in
a non-democratic setting through a case study of Macao under the leadership
of Fernando Chui, the chief executive of Macao, in his ﬁrst term of ofﬁce, to
provide empirical ﬁndings and shed more light on this important question.
Facing the decline of legitimacy left behind by Edmund Ho, the ﬁrst chief
executive of Macao, Chui, followed the governing logic and path of Chinese
leaders to use political marketing to narrow the legitimacy gap, with a further
hope of reducing the demand for structural political reforms. Employing the
political brands of ‘‘sunshine government’’ and ‘‘scientiﬁc administration,’’
Chui attempted to portray himself to both the Beijing government and the
people of Macao as a capable leader. However, this political marketing did
not reduce public dissatisfaction or reverse the declining legitimacy of the
Macao government. Even worse, once public conﬁdence in the promises
made by Chui had been severely undermined by political controversies,
including the welfare package for chief executives and principal ofﬁcials, the
structural crisis of legitimacy inherent in the MSAR political system ﬁnally
erupted to bring a new wave of governance crisis. In the end, instead of the
demand for structural political reforms fading, the demand for democracy in
Macao actually increased.
70. Lees-Marshment, Political Marketing, 2.
788  ASIAN SURVEY 57:4
This article does not claim that political marketing is useless for the
governing of a hybrid regime, but it does have its limitations. Referring to
its origins, political marketing has been used mainly to facilitate communi-
cation and enhance the link between the elite and the public in the process of
democratic government; it was never intended to replace the system of
democracy. It mainly serves a complementary rather than a substituting
function in a democracy. It would be overstretching the concept and creating
an unrealistic expectation to argue that political marketing can completely
compensate for the structural deﬁciencies of an authoritarian system and
perfectly substitute for a democracy to bridge the legitimacy gap between
the two.
Furthermore, using political marketing to replace political reforms in
a society with a growing demand for democratization can easily exacerbate
political instability, often in the form of non-institutional and contentious
politics with a high level of state–society tension. Without political reforms,
there is also a weak structural incentive for policymakers and bureaucrats to
provide the characteristics and performance of a true democracy. Without the
corresponding institutions and structures, promises of democratic elements
made by a non-democratic government in the course of political marketing
are difﬁcult to fulﬁll. Empty promises can give rise to more public frustration
and further impair legitimacy. A vicious cycle of undelivered promises and
shrinking legitimacy will be formed if the pattern persists of relying solely on
political marketing without implementing structural reforms.
The case of Macao shows that using political marketing to resolve a struc-
tural political problem in a hybrid regime can be a dead-end solution. A long-
term and more reliable solution to the legitimacy problem inMacao would be
the early implementation of comprehensive constitutional reforms, in par-
ticular universal suffrage for the chief executive election, which would give
real choices to the people in the selection of their political leader. Without
this step forward, the structural source of the legitimacy gap in Macao will
remain a political challenge, and any government’s maladministration may
quickly lead to another serious governance crisis.
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